We study the decision of when to sue in a game in which multiple plaintiffs have similar cases against a single defendant. Two legal regimes are considered. In one, prior results are binding in all future cases. In contrast, under the prevalent asymmetric regime, adverse results are binding against the defendant in future actions, but a judgement adverse to one plaintiff will not be binding against another plaintiff. Some legal scholars have argued that such a system is unfair to defendants and benefits plaintiffs. Our analysis reveals, however, that an asymmetric regime may actually hurt plaintiffs in equilibrium by inducing them to wait. JEL Classification: C72, K41
Introduction
Multi-party litigation is common. In many instances, more than one plaintiff will have a similar claim against a single defendant. Consider, for instance, the ongoing lawsuits against the tobacco companies, 1 or the recent anti-trust case against Microsoft. 2 A key feature of the judicial system with regard to multi-plaintiff litigations is the effect of precedents because the outcome of earlier cases can provide important benchmarks for any future litigation involving a similar issue, thereby shortening the difficult decision process. In extreme cases, in which the issues are identical, courts may preclude re-litigation of the issue altogether by subjecting any future litigants to the prior decision -the socalled "collateral estoppel" doctrine in common law countries being one such practice. 3 The series of tobacco lawsuits is one of many multi-plaintiff cases in which precedents and correlated decisions have played an important part in shaping the outcome, and, in particular, the plaintiffs' timing decision on when to sue. It is indeed informative to observe that the timing of over 40 U.S. states' filings against the tobacco industry spans more than 4 years (from May 1994 (Mississipi) to August 1998 (Nebraska)), and that the federal lawsuit was filed almost immediately after the conclusion of the state litigations in 1999. 4 1 In recent years, major international tobacco companies, including Philip Morris, American Tobacco, and R.J. Reynolds, have been sued by a majority of the state governments and the federal government of the U.S. for, among other things, compensation for increased medical care expenses allegedly arising from the companies' deliberate efforts to bolster the addictiveness of cigarettes. The states have reached settlement either independently or as part of a master settlement plan agreed to in November 1998. The federal litigation is currently on-going. The legal battle has also been active in the civil arena and in the rest of the world. The cases are already numerous, and many have already reached highstake verdicts and are working their way through the appeals system. More individuals and classes are expected to follow suit in the future, especially following some landmark verdicts of late (e.g.
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al. and Boeken v. Philip Morris).
2 After years of investigation, the U.S. Justice Department and 20 U.S. states launched anti-trust lawsuits against Microsoft. In 2001, the Justice Department and some of the supporting states agreed on a settlement, while the other states later settled their cases separately. Following the U.S., the European Union initiated a similar anti-trust claim against the company, resulting in imposition of a fine. 3 There are several conditions for the collateral estoppel doctrine to apply. One requirement is that the issue was actually decided in a prior proceeding. See footnote 5 in Che and Yi [3] and the references therein. 4 See the Appendix for the exact dates of the states' filings. Notice that those who
There are two main issues surrounding multi-plaintiff litigations. First, the legal literature has debated the desirability of the so-called "option effect" generated by precedents. Currie [5] and Ratliff [12] , for instance, argue that precedents foster a "wait-and-see" attitude among plaintiffs, who will therefore fail to co-ordinate their actions to make a joinder that may otherwise be efficient. Second, and more importantly, these authors claim that the present regime of asymmetric precedent effects under the collateral estoppel doctrine is unfair. They stress that a defendant who obtains a favorable judgment must re-litigate the same issue numerous times, whereas a defendant who obtains an adverse judgment is bound by that judgment in all future suits against him.
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Using a simple quantitative analysis, Note [9] suggests that a defendant does indeed expect to lose much more under an asymmetric regime than under a symmetric regime.
This paper takes on these issues from a game-theoretic perspective. We study how parties decide when to sue and how this is affected by the law surrounding claim and issue preclusion. Surprisingly, and contrary to the legal literature, our analysis reveals that an asymmetric precedent regime may actually hurt the plaintiffs in equilibrium precisely because it induces them to wait and see.
We consider the following game. There are two identical plaintiffs who want to litigate the same issue against a single defendant. The game is a dynamic one (with a potentially infinite horizon) in which the plaintiffs choose strategies over two action sets: timing and expenditure. The latter action matters because it determines the likelihood of the first plaintiff winning his case and hence the benefit for the plaintiff who waits and litigates next. The precedent effect serves to correlate the winning probability between prior and later trials and also to reduce the litigation cost for the later plaintiff.
We allow for the possibility that simultaneous litigation results in better payoffs for the plaintiffs than litigating alone at a time. This may be because of the possibility of forming a class action.
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Better still, however, is to benefit managed independent settlements are all among the early suers.
5 Defenders of the current regime argue that issue preclusion against nonparty plaintiffs would be extremely unfair, and perhaps even unconstitutional, because it would deprive plaintiffs of their "day in court". On the other hand, there is no unfairness in binding defendants offensively because bound defendants have had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" their defenses. 6 In the motivating tobacco case, it is not clear to what extent co-ordination was indeed a choice among the state prosecutors from different states. But, the fact that a master from precedents set in a prior trial. If one successfully waits for the other to pursue the trial first (and makes the right amount of expenditure), he can expect to get more from "free-riding" on the precedent tomorrow than from pursuing simultaneous action today.
We solve for subgame-perfect equilibria in both pure and (non-degenerate) behavioral strategies in this dynamic litigation game, which is basically a variant of the well-known war of attrition. It is trivial to show that there exist only asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in this game. In any such equilibrium, litigation must occur sequentially: one plaintiff acts first, followed by the other, who then reaps the benefits from precedents. As long as the plaintiffs discount the future, all litigations must take place at the beginning of the game. Here, simultaneous action cannot be supported in equilibrium because a plaintiff's attempt to deter the other from waiting by promising to make only a small litigation expenditure if he is the first one in (thereby reducing the impact of precedent) is not credible. The game ends for a plaintiff once he has played in.
The multiplicity of equilibra in pure strategies, however, raises the question: "But, who goes in first?". This is particularly frustrating in our context because the plaintiffs are identical. In order to address this issue, we fully characterize the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the game by considering behavioral strategies as well. It turns out that, provided the plaintiffs discount the future, there exists a (non-degenerate) behavioral strategy equilibrium that is stationary and, moreover, symmetric. Each plaintiff randomizes between suing and not suing in every period with an equal probability. We also establish a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. This equilibrium generates not only sequential litigation but also simultaneous litigation with a positive probability. In addition, it may take some time before any actions take place, despite discounting.
This equilibrium characterization then allows us to assess the implications of precedent effects. First, in any pure strategy equilibrium of the game, we indeed find that class (simultaneous) action always fails in the presence of sufficiently large precedent effects, and also that an asymmetric precedent regime is more favorable for the plaintiffs in terms of their aggregate expected recovery than a symmetric precedent regime. However, we derive a settlement plan was agreed upon seems to suggest potential efficiency gains from cooperation. In the Microsoft case, it should be noticed that the Justice Department and states co-ordinated their actions from the beginning.
rather different set of conclusions by taking the equilibrium that involves randomization. In this case, both class and sequential litigation can occur with positive probabilities (possibly after some delay). Moreover, asymmetry in precedent effect makes things worse for the plaintiffs but not necessarily for the defendant. Shifting from a symmetric to an asymmetric regime increases the benefit from acting second; therefore, in equilibrium both plaintiffs wait with a greater probability in each period, thereby increasing the likelihood of co-ordination failure and the magnitude of inefficiency arising from it.
There are several other papers in the economics literature that have also examined the subject treated here. Che [1] is the first to use economic tools in analyzing the strategic motives for multiple plaintiffs. He demonstrates that, in an incomplete information setting with heterogeneous claims and damage averaging, the scale economies associated with class action are not sufficient to elicit full membership.
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Adverse selection and the signaling effect (much like in the "lemons" problem) lead some of the plaintiffs to opt out and litigate individually. In another paper, Che [2] views class action as a special case within the more general issue of collective bargaining. The paper argues that, under asymmetric information (but with no damage averaging or economies of scale), consolidating claims can have strategic benefits in that it enhances the bargaining power of the plaintiffs.
Spier [14] considers the implications of bargaining externalities between multiple plaintiffs. The defendant is wealth-constrained and courts' decisions are correlated (but there is no asymmetric information or heterogeneity), so the settlement by one plaintiff affects the other plaintiff's expected payoff at trial. Spier then compares the settlement outcomes and the allocation of the bargaining surplus under different degrees of correlation and different organizational alternatives (centralized or decentralized action). Although this paper, unlike Che's papers, does not explicitly deal with the plaintiff's organizational choice, its results show that, for intermediate degrees of correlation, the plaintiffs would be better off with decentralized actions.
All of the papers mentioned above essentially involve static analysis. The present paper, on the other hand, develops a dynamic setting in which the role of precedents is to cause a sensitive timing decision issue among the plaintiffs. The precedent effect is analyzed by Che and Yi [3] in a two-period litigation game in which two plaintiffs, one in each period, file claims against a single defendant over related issues. Their main result posits that, for sufficiently high winning probabilities for the first plaintiff, there will be more settlement (relative to the situation with no precedent) in the first period because the defendant makes a high settlement offer in the fear of an unfavorable precedent being set. There is, in a sense, a first-mover advantage that arises because of the precedent effect, but the authors do not endogenize the decision on when to sue. In our setting, there is no pretrial settlement, so the precedent effect works in favor of those who wait. (After all, precedents only operate if the issues have actually been litigated.)
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we define the dynamic litigation game. We then solve for subgame-perfect equilibria of the game and discuss the results in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the issue of asymmetry in precedent effects. In section 5, we discuss the robustness of the analysis when an active defendant is introduced and has means to deter waiting. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Dynamic Litigation Game
Consider two risk-neutral plaintiffs, indexed i = 1, 2, and a single risk-neutral defendant. The plaintiffs are identical and face exactly the same case against the defendant. We analyze a dynamic litigation game in which the critical decision faced by the plaintiffs is when to sue. The game is essentially a variant of the war of attrition.
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Time is discrete and (potentially) infinite, so t = 1, 2, . . . , ∞. At each t, the plaintiffs can play either "in" or "out". The action "in" can be interpreted as filing for a lawsuit. The common discount factor is δ ∈ [0, 1].
We denote by D ∈ (0, ∞) each plaintiff's monetary award from winning the case. What he gets in the event of loss is normalized to zero. We assume for now that the defendant is only a passive participant in the litigation game. Also, any possibility of pre-trial settlement is ruled out.
After a plaintiff has played in, he observes how many plaintiffs have played in at that period and subsequently faces the following decision problem.
If the plaintiff is the only player in, he faces an individual maximization problem over how much to spend for litigating his individual case. This will determine his probability of winning the case. Once this choice has been made, the game ends for the plaintiff and he will no longer affect future play of the game.
Let us denote the expenditure choice of plaintiff i by x i > 0. The winning probability for an individual lawsuit is denoted by q a (x i ) ∈ [0, 1], where q a (0) = 0, q a > 0 and q a < 0. There is positive, but decreasing, marginal benefit from expenditure. Plaintiff i's expected payoff from individual action is then
which implies the first-order condition
Since D is bounded, the solution to maximizing the above expected payoff will be unique and interior. Let us call this x a .
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Also, let us denote the maximum payoff by
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If both plaintiffs play in at the same period, the game immediately ends with each plaintiff obtaining a symmetric payoff C. We make the following assumption:
What we are allowing for is thus the possibility that simultaneous litigations result in better payoffs for the plaintiffs than when they are the only litigant at a given time. There are several reasons why simultaneous but individual litigations may generate a positive externality for the plaintiffs. For instance, information may be shared, thus reducing their litigation expenditures. Multiple litigations over the same issue at the same time may also induce wider media coverage and hence more sympathetic public awareness.
In addition, certain circumstances may call forth "class action" suits, which, as modelled in Che [1] , brings economies of scale to litigation. If such joinder is a possible organizational alternative for the plaintiffs, we can reasonably interpret both plaintiffs being "in" as a class action and justify (A-1) with strict inequality. For instance, consider the following description of what may happen after the plaintiffs simultaneously play in.
Suppose both plaintiffs have played in. Instead of the litigation game immediately ending, there are two additional stages that the plaintiffs have 9 Note that, given the decreasing nature of the marginal productivity of plaintiff expenditure, an upward adjustment to the compensatory award will increase x a . There exists a substantial literature investigating various legal variables that influence trial effort. See Cooter and Rubinfeld [4] for a survey. 10 We can easily show that A > 0.
to play. In the first stage, the plaintiffs have a simultaneous choice between acting alone "a" or acting collectively "c". Class action can take place only if both plaintiffs choose c, in which case the litigation game ends with both receiving the payoff C. If at least one plaintiff opts a, then both plaintiffs litigate individually or move to the second stage, in which they choose expenditure level x. The litigation game ends after this stage. We know that there is a unique optimum value for x, so let us fold this back and summarize this subgame in the following one-shot form. It is a co-ordination game.
a c a A, A A, A c A, A C, C
If C > A, there are two Nash equilibria of the above game: (a, a) and (c, c). The first of these two equilibria, (a, a), however, involves actions that are weakly dominated. (In other words, (c, c) is the only trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.) In this sense, we can expect co-ordination and class action to arise as a reasonable equilibrium outcome in the presence of joinder possibility and economies of scale when both plaintiffs play "in".
Since we shall be investigating for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic litigation game, we may abstract away from this part of the plaintiffs' decision-making in order to focus on the timing issue. The precise interpretation of what happens after both plaintiffs simultaneously play in is immaterial to our main analysis. What matters are the relative payoffs as encapsulated in the assumption (A-1).
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We now introduce the "precedent effect". Consider a situation at some date t + s (s > 0) in which only plaintiff i has already played in and spent x i for his litigation at some prior date t. If the other plaintiff goes in now, the outcome of the previous trial affects the outcome of his trial in the following two ways:
It may also be possible that simultaneous actions harm the plaintiff's interests such that C < A. Weinstein [17] , for example, puts forward several arguments for the compromised efficiency under competing class actions, especially, those exploiting the segmented state jurisdictions in the United States. Allowing for this alternative case will not alter the main results below. We shall not make this point explicit, however, because it makes the second-mover advantage somewhat trivial. 12 We here avoid the possibility that the first plaintiff can successfully file for mandatory First, his winning probability increases (decreases) if the first plaintiff has won (lost). In the literature, this is called correlated decisions. Since the case is identical for both plaintiffs in the present setting, we have perfectly correlated cases. If the first plaintiff wins his case, then the probability of the second plaintiff winning his trial is one. (The legal procedure that facilitates this is the so-called "offensive collateral estoppel" doctrine.) If, on the other hand, the first trial is won by the defendant, the precedent effect applies symmetrically, and the second plaintiff automatically loses his case as well. (This is the application of the "defensive collateral estoppel" doctrine.) Perfect correlation is of course a special case, and correlated decisions prevail in a more general way without appealing to the collateral estoppel doctrine. Nonetheless, it serves to simplify the analysis here.
Second, the precedent effect reduces the litigation costs of the following plaintiff. The collateral estoppel procedure prevents the relevant party from re-litigating the same issue decided in an earlier trial and therefore greatly simplifies the costly litigation process for the following litigants. For expositional ease, we assume that this cost-reduction effect brings the litigation cost to zero for the second plaintiff.
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The above specification of the precedent effect implies that, at t, given one plaintiff i goes in and litigates alone with expenditure x i today, the other plaintiff j's expected payoff from following him in at t + s is just δ ). Now, we make the following assumption:
The above inequality represents the potential benefit from successfully waiting (for the other plaintiff to go in first and litigate with expenditure x a today). Though simultaneous action is the best outcome in a static situation, the above assumption implies that, in a dynamic setting, free-riding on the other plaintiff's efforts may yield a superior payoff for each plaintiff under the precedent regime.
class formation that will prevent further individual litigation on the same issue. For example, the court may order that anyone who bought a certain harmful drug during a certain period from the defendant pharmaceutical company and wishes to litigate his claim must do so through class action. This is not possible in our model. 13 In a sense, all the second plaintiff has to do is file a suit, and this is assumed to be a costless procedure.
Several comments are in order. First, it is obvious that we need a sufficiently large value of δ to validate the assumption (A-2). Second, the above assumption says that the benefit from the precedent effect outweighs that from simultaneous action if the first plaintiff spends the optimal level of expenditure x a or more. We must mention this element of the game because, if the first plaintiff spends less than x a , it may not be worthwhile for the other to wait after all. We must therefore analyze carefully what each plaintiff does in terms of expenditure as well as timing.
14 More generally, the existence of second-mover advantage depends on what happens in the subgame following the first entry. We shall later introduce an active defendant who has actions that may work to reduce the impact of precedent and hence deter waiting.
We complete the description of the dynamic litigation game by defining the strategies. A pure strategy f i for plaintiff i is a function that assigns to every possible history two sets of actions -specifically, (1) whether to play in or out and (2) how much to spend on litigation once in, given the number of plaintiffs in at the time. To simplify notations, let us index by λ ∈ {a, c} the number of plaintiffs in (a for one and c for two) at the time each plaintiff i plays in. Formally, a strategy is written in two parts. The first part specifies the plaintiff's timing decision. The second part specifies his expenditure decision after playing in and if he is the lone player in at the time. For i = 1, 2,
A behavioral strategy, b i , specifies a pair of conditional probabilities (b
, which assigns to every history probability distributions over each of two action sets.
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For i = 1, 2,
14 In the conventional modeling of litigation, both the expenditure choice and the magnitude of precedent effects are exogenously given. See Che [1] and Spier [14] , for example. 15 Thus, a behavioral strategy is a plan of a collection of randomizations, one for each period. By contrast, a mixed strategy specifies a probability measure over the set of pure strategies. It is more natural to think of randomization in terms of behavioral strategies in a timing game.
Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we study the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the dynamic litigation game described above in both pure and (non-degenerate) behavioral strategies. After formal derivations, we offer an account of how one might interpret the results, especially in the context of the existing literature on the subject.
Pure Strategy
If we consider just the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic litigation game, simultaneous action is a possible equilibrium outcome. Consider a stationary and symmetric strategy profile in which both plaintiffs always play in, after which they always spendx < x a if λ = a. Such strategies form a Nash equilibrium ifx is sufficiently smaller than x a so that W (x) < C. In other words, each plaintiff can threaten the other by promising to expend just a small effort if they are litigating the case first by themselves. This deters the other plaintiff from waiting and taking advantage of the precedent set in the first trial.
This kind of threat, however, lacks credibility and will not survive under the requirements of subgame perfection. It follows that the game does not admit any symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategy.
Proposition 1 There exists no symmetric pure strategy SPE in the dynamic litigation game.
Proof : Suppose not. So, suppose that the plaintiffs play symmetrically in equilibrium. If so, there can be only two types of possible outcome paths generated by such equilibrium strategy profiles. We shall consider them each in turn.
First, consider the outcome in which no one ever goes in at any t. This cannot, however, constitute an equilibrium because A > 0; that is, it is better for either plaintiff to play in at some t (and litigate with expenditure x a ) than to stay out forever, which yields zero payoff. Hence, we have contradiction.
Second, consider the other possible outcome, which involves both plaintiffs going in at some t. Given 
The game, however, has an asymmetric pure strategy SPE. It is easy to verify that the above profile indeed constitutes an SPE. It is clearly a Nash equilibrium strategy at the beginning of the dynamic litigation game (of t = 1). Now let us consider the following subgames. If no one has yet gone in at the beginning of any t > 1, the stationary structure of the game implies that the profile is also a Nash equilibrium profile for the subgame starting at that period. Any other relevant history of the game must involve either plaintiff playing in first. (The game ends if both play in.) But then, we effectively have simple individual maximization problems for both plaintiffs and the above profile correctly deals with them.
The above strategy profile results in all litigations taking place in the first two periods. Can delay possibly arise in any equilibrium? From Proposition 1, we know that perpetual delay cannot be possible, which implies that the case will be litigated at some stage of the game. We also know that, because there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium, any (asymmetric) equilibrium must generate an outcome in which one plaintiff litigates the case first, followed by the remaining plaintiff. Then, it is obvious that as long as the plaintiffs discount the future all of the litigations must take place at the beginning. We summarize this point in the following Remark.
Remark 2 Consider the outcome path generated by any (asymmetric) pure strategy SPE. Notice that, if δ < 1, the first plaintiff goes in and spends x a at t = 1. Moreover, if the first plaintiff wins his case, the remaining plaintiff will immediately follow in (and spend zero expenditure) at t = 2. If the first plaintiff loses, on the other hand, the second plaintiff is indifferent between going in at any t > 1 and staying out forever because the award in the event of loss is normalized to zero.
Also, the results in this section do not depend upon the assumption that the game ends for the plaintiff who plays in. Suppose instead that, after a plaintiff has played in and observed the other player's decision, he can further decide whether to litigate the case in that period or to re-enter the timing game.
Even in this modified case, it is clear that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium. If one plaintiff goes in and then stays in at some t, the other plaintiff's best response is not to do the same, but rather to wait and litigate in the next period. The same type of strategies as given in the proof of Proposition 2 above will deliver an asymmetric equilibrium, resulting in sequential litigations.
Behavioral Strategy
We now characterize subgame-perfect equilibria of the game in non-degenerate behavioral strategies (henceforth referred to simply as behavioral strategies for expositional ease). What immediately follows from the pure strategy analysis in the previous subsection is that the game effectively ends once one plaintiff plays in. Both the expenditure decision of the plaintiff who plays in first (Remark 1) and the timing and expenditure decisions of the plaintiff who remains out (Remark 2) are trivial to analyze and will have no impact on the analysis below. We can thus "fold back" these parts of the history. The history at t that matters is simply the fact that both plaintiffs are still remaining out and playing the timing game. So, we restrict our attention only to the part of the timing decision that specifies a conditional probability of each plaintiff playing in at each period if no one has gone in before. Proposition 3 first establishes that there exists a behavioral strategy SPE that is stationary and symmetric, provided that C = A and δ < 1.
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Proposition 3 If C = A and δ < 1, there exists a behavioral strategy SPE that is stationary and symmetric. Further, there can be at most one such equilibrium.
Proof : Let b i (t) denote the probability of plaintiff i playing "in" at t given that no one has played in before. Also, let X i (t + 1) denote plaintiff i's continuation payoff at t if both plaintiffs play out then.
For any behavioral strategy profile to constitute an SPE, we need that, for every t, each plaintiff is indifferent between playing in and playing out given that the other plaintiff is also randomizing. In other words, it must be that, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j, and ∀t,
Given that at t the other plaintiff i is randomizing with probability b i (t), the left-hand side represents plaintiff j's expected payoff from playing in and the right-hand side that from playing out, in which case the plaintiffs will play the same game again at t + 1 and j will get the (discounted) continuation payoff X j (t + 1).
On the other hand, in equilibrium, it must also be that
By substituting the top equation in (3) into (2) to eliminate X j (t + 1), we find the following first-order non-linear difference equation in b i (t):
where
16 But, recall that δ cannot be too low if the second-mover advantage is to be sustained.
Notice that if C = A, the difference equation is indeterminate. So, the game requires C > A to admit behavioral strategy equilibria.
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We are looking for a stationary value of b i (t) ∈ (0, 1) that solves the difference equation, which can be categorically represented by equation
where the curve corresponding to g is the phase line. We know that g(0) = β α and g(1) = −∞ (because β < γ). Also, we can derive
which is always negative (because β < γ), implying that g is strictly monotonic decreasing in b i (t). This information about g implies that there exists a stationary solution to the difference equation in the range (0, 1) (which occurs when g crosses the 45 degree line) and, moreover, there can be at most one such solution if and only if g(0) = β α > 0. This is true if δ < 1 (and C > A). Finally, the problem is symmetric across i = 1, 2, and hence the uniqueness of the stationary solution to the difference equation implies that the solution is also symmetric.
The next proposition finds a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the behavioral strategy SPE established in the previous result. It turns out that what we need here is for the additional benefit from free-riding on precedents over pursuing simultaneous action, (W a − C), to be greater than the additional benefit from acting together over acting alone at a given time, (C − A).
Proposition 4 Suppose W a − C > C − A (and C = A). Then, for any δ < 1, the dynamic litigation game admits a unique behavioral strategy SPE.
Proof : First, recall the difference equation (4) above as
Let us denote the stationary solution to the above system by b * . We must have b i (t) ∈ (0, 1) for every t. This implies that, if the above system is (globally) unstable, the stationary (and symmetric) equilibrium corresponding to b * is the unique behavioral strategy SPE of the whole game. For instability, we need |g (b)| > 1 ∀b, which implies from (6) above that
Notice that
≤ C − A ∀b and ∀δ. This establishes the sufficient condition for uniqueness as in the claim.
What should happen if the game has multiple behavioral strategy equilibria? Because the difference equation system is then stable, we can observe in equilibrium the plaintiffs randomizing initially with a probability different from b * (not necessarily in a symmetric pattern), but then both gradually converging towards b * (at the same speed because the phase line takes the same form for i = 1, 2). In addition, the negative slope of the phase line means that b i (t) must oscillate around b * on its way towards convergence.
Interpretation
We have made a formal analysis of the strategic interaction between two plaintiffs in a dynamic game setting in which the precedent effect from a prior litigation can be large enough to outweigh any potential benefit from making simultaneous ligations.
We first solved for subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategy. In any such equilibrium, the plaintiffs fail to act at the same time: either plaintiff litigates the case individually first, followed by the remaining plaintiff who then benefits from the precedent set in the prior trial. As long as the plaintiffs discount the future, all litigations must take place at the beginning of the game.
From an economist's point of view, however, this provides a somewhat unsatisfactory characterization of the outcome of the situation that we purport to explain. The reason is that the pure strategy equilibria do not distinguish who should be going in first. Therefore, we fully characterized the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the game by also considering (non-degenerate) behavioral strategy. It turns out that, provided the plaintiffs discount the future, there exists a behavioral strategy SPE that is stationary and, moreover, symmetric. We also established a sufficient condition for its uniqueness. Given that the plaintiffs are identical, one may view that a symmetric rather than asymmetric equilibrium strategy profile is a more reasonable reflection of how the plaintiffs actually behave in reality.
The behavioral strategy SPE generates a very different outcome from the pure strategy equilibria. In this type of equilibrium, it is possible to observe not only sequential litigations but also simultaneous action. Moreover, it is possible, despite discounting, to observe a delay (of any length) before any litigation actually takes place. For instance, notice that the probability of delay for t periods is simply (1−b * ) 2t under the stationary behavioral strategy equilibrium.
So, how do we interpret behavioral strategy in this context? Naturally, one can think of it as a deliberate decision by a player to use randomness in his behavior, like a poker player who randomly "bluffs" or a tax authority who randomly audits taxpayers. Behavioral strategy equilibrium can also be interpreted without appealing to deliberate probabilistic selection of actions. For instance, the probabilities can be viewed as the players' beliefs about the others' actions, with each player in equilbrium choosing an action that is a best response to the equilibrium beliefs.
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Asymmetric Precedent Effect
We have thus far assumed that precedent effects work symmetrically. That is, the determination of an issue in a prior litigation has identical influence on both the defendant and future plaintiffs if they meet in future lawsuits on similar issues. In cases where the rules of collateral estoppel apply, relitigation is precluded against both parties outright.
Under the current rules of collateral estoppel in actual fact, precedents work asymmetrically. A future plaintiff is able to rely on a previous judgement against the defendant but is not bound by that judgement if the defendant wins. As a consequence, the second plaintiff can re-litigate the issue even if the defendant won in the prior litigation. However, the relative merits of such rules have been debated in the legal literature where critics have argued instead for a symmetric system such as the one assumed here.
In the legal literature, criticism has been voiced against the current regime of asymmetric precedent effects for its lack of fairness towards the defendant (Currie [5] , Polasky [11] , George [8] , Schroeder [13] , Ratliff [12] , Spurr [16] , and Note [9] ). In particular, Note [9] makes a simple formal analysis in which the defendant's total expected liability is computed under different regimes and demonstrates that the defendant expects to pay out much more under asymmetric precedents than under symmetric precedents.
We present a counter-suggestion. If we take a (non-degenerate) behavioral strategy SPE of the game, then asymmetry in precedent effects does not necessarily create any additional unfairness as such. If anything, it will reduce the plaintiffs' total expected recovery.
Let us first clarify the implications of asymmetric precedent effects in our analysis. If we allow for just the plaintiffs to benefit from precedents, it is obvious that payoff W (x i ), expected by the plaintiff j, who successfully waits for the other plaintiff i to play in first, should increase for any x i . The second plaintiff can now re-litigate the case even if the first plaintiff has lost, and this makes him ex ante better off. Let us denote byW a the higher payoff under asymmetric precedent regime corresponding to W a that has appeared so far. The other relevant payoffs, C and A, remain the same since these values are not affected by precedents.
Consider the following two regimes. The first regime, denoted by R 1 , dictates symmetric precedent effects as postulated in our analysis thus far. The second regime, R 2 , has asymmetric precedent effects. As discussed above, the only substantive difference between the two regimes is that the payof W a associated with regime R 2 is greater than W a associated with R 1 . Let us assume that δ < 1 and W a − C > C − A > 0, so that the game has a unique behavioral strategy SPE that is stationary and symmetric.
19
Let us denote this equilibrium by b. The game also has a pure strategy equilibrium in which litigations occur sequentially (at the beginning of the game because of discounting). We index this equilibrium by f .
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Now, let Π R l , f l=1, 2 and Π (R l , b) l=1,2 define the plaintiffs' aggregate expected payoff under regime R l and the pure strategy equilibrium f , and under regime R l and the behavioral strategy equilibrium b. The following result compares the two precedent regimes under the two different types of equilibrium.
For the second part, notice first that, under b, each plaintiff at every t (given that the game is still being played) is indifferent between going in and staying out and expects the same payoff no matter which strategy he plays. In the case of R 1 , this payoff amounts to
whereX represents the stationary and symmetric continuation payoff due to the nature of the equilibrium.
From the difference equation (4) The shift from a symmetric regime to an asymmetric regime has an opposite effect under the two types of equilibrium. If we take any pure strategy equilibrium, the plaintiffs are better off collectively under asymmetric precedent effects; however, they become worse off by the regime shift under the behavioral strategy equilibrium. This result highlights the inefficiency that the presence of precedent effects may generate upon the plaintiffs. Notice that co-ordinating their actions and pursuing simultaneous action is better for both plaintiffs than any behavioral strategy equilibrium (C > bC + (1 − b)A) .
The critical parameter that determines the magnitude of the inefficiency is W a , which is the value of successfully waiting. Making precedents work asymmetrically will increase this and hence result in both plaintiffs waiting with a higher probability. This will in turn make co-ordination failure a more likely event and reduce each plaintiff's expected payoff in every period.
Notice, however, that asymmetry does not necessarily improve the defendant's position in this behavioral strategy SPE. C and A are not analogous to what the defendant expects to pay out but rather to the plaintiffs' expected payoff net of their litigation expenditures. It may be that the defendant expects to pay out more against an individual litigant acting alone than against multiple litigants acting simultaneously if the additional benefits are materialized in economized spending rather than increased expected award. In this case, an increase in b * will make the defendant worse off as well. Of course, the defendant is always worse off under an asymmetric regime if we take any pure strategy equilibrium.
Active Defendant
We have up until now assumed that the defendant is merely a passive presence in the game. In reality, however, defendants have several instruments at their disposal that they can employ to counteract plaintiffs who attempt to exploit the precedent effect. Defendants can control their own litigation expenditures to reduce the probability of the plaintiff winning, and they can also try to settle the case out of court. Such efforts are likely to reduce the second-mover advantage and thus deter waiting. We shall now consider these possibilities in turn and discuss the robustness of the analysis under the conditions of an active defendant.
Front-Loading
Let us now suppose that the probability of a plaintiff winning his individual trial is determined by the defendant's effort, y ≥ 0, as well as the plaintiff's own, x ≥ 0. This probability function is written by q a (x, y) and we have q Since we are considering subgame-perfect equilibria, we only need to consider the players' optimal choice of litigation expenditures in relevant situations. Let us now compute Nash equilibrium expenditure choices of the defendant and the plaintiffs in two cases: (1) there is only one plaintiff litigating and the litigation is one-off (in other words, there is no precedent or another plaintiff waiting); and (2) there is only one plaintiff litigating, but another plaintiff awaits to be bound by the outcome of the current litigation. (1 − µ) . A higher value of µ, which indicates the (symmetric) impact of the parties' effort on trial probability, implies higher equilibrium litigation efforts and hence lower expected payoff for the plaintiff.
In the second case, the plaintiff again maximizes D(x, y) − x but does not care about the other plaintiff who is waiting. However, the defendant does. The defendant chooses y to minimize (assuming common discount factor)
where the second term represents the effect of the precedent that the first outcome generates upon the second plaintiff who is waiting. This implies that y * * > x * * and also that the defendant front-loads his efforts, as discussed in Che and Yi [3] . We can derive that
Precedent effect induces the defendant to spend more when there is another plaintiff waiting than when there is not. The first plaintiff, in response, spends less.
What is the overall impact of this on the value of waiting? Let W be this value, which amounts to
Let us then consider a necessary condition for the precedent effect to be sufficiently large that the plaintiffs' timing decisions remain the same as in the original analysis. We need the inequality W > A to be true, or
Thus, when we have an active defendant, the validity of the analysis in this particular example depends on the value of µ as well as δ. For a given discount factor, it is straightforward to see that we need a sufficiently high value of µ to justify the second-mover advantage and maintain our analysis.
Pretrial Settlement
If a case is settled out of court, it does not set any precedent. A defendant who is concerned about binding himself to a decision for future plaintiffs may very well wish to settle the first case even if he has to pay out more than otherwise. As Che and Yi [3] demonstrate, the presence of a later plaintiff may enable the early plaintiff to extract a higher settlement from the defendant, thereby potentially generating a first-mover advantage. The question is whether our endogenous timing analysis will be robust when allowing for pretrial settlement opportunity. Determining this requires analysis of incomplete information because there is no need for court involvement if the stakes are commonly known. Every case will be settled in order to economize on trial costs. For the purpose of the present paper, we shall not propose a new model of the dynamic litigation game with incomplete information. We conjecture that our results on timing issues will be robust in such a model. The reason is that typically in models of settlement, including the sequential litigation model of Che and Yi [3] (and also Daughety and Reinganum [6] ), the equilibrium settlement offer and rate depend upon exogenous parameters such as the cost of litigation, the probability of the plaintiff winning, and prior distribution over the possible types on each plaintiff. Thus, we expect that under some parametric configurations there will not be "too much" settlement against a plaintiff, should he be the first one to play in while the other waits in the wings.
Moreover, there may be a second-mover advantage even with prior lawsuits being settled out of court. In a recent paper, Daughety and Reinganum [6] consider a model of sequential litigation (with exogenously given timing) in which private information involves the extent of the defendant's culpability (rather than the extent of a plaintiff's stake as in other models of settlement). The later plaintiff can then find himself in a better position than the earlier plaintiff as information is revealed by the defendant's actions against the first plaintiff, whether it be in a trial, a settlement, or even a confidential settlement. 21 
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to formally characterize the timing behavior of multiple plaintiffs under precedent effects. In the dynamic litigation game analyzed, it is shown that, provided the plaintiffs discount the future, symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium exists only in behavioral strategies. We also establish a condition for the uniqueness of such equilibrium. In this equilibrium, sequential litigation is not a certain event; simultaneous action can also occur with positive probability, as can any length of delay in litigation taking place despite discounting. We argue that this type of equilibrium provides a reasonable description of the phenomenon that we set out to study.
Two implications emerge from the analysis. First, the incentive to exploit the precedent effect explains why we may fail to observe mutually beneficial simultaneous actions, particularly class actions, taking place. (Recall the justification for interpreting simultaneous entry as a joinder.) Thus, the paper provides a game-theoretic foundation for the legal literature on the issue (Currie [5] , Polasky [11] , Ratliff [12] among others). Second, it is interesting to find the comparative static result that making the precedent effect asymmetrically favorable to the plaintiffs may actually hurt the plaintiffs due to the worsened free-riding problem. This contrasts with the legal view that an asymmetric precedent regime generates greater unfairness towards the defendant.
There is, however, a question as to why the plaintiffs do not attempt to overcome the free-riding problem and co-ordinate their timing through, for instance, some ex ante contracting. Co-ordinated simultaneous actions or sequential actions (where one plaintiff helps the other to litigate first and set the precedent) fare better on aggregate than the symmetric, decentralized outcome in which the plaintiffs randomize. There are several responses to this. First, the plaintiff simply may not know the identity of the other plaintiffs ex ante. He knows that there are other potential plaintiffs also harmed by the same product that caused him the damage, but until someone actually exposes himself to litigation, he may not know who that other person is. Once another person moves in, of course, it is best for the plaintiff to wait and see how the first litigation plays out. Second, there is a serious possibility of adverse incentives on lawyers who represent the plaintiffs (or even different groups of plaintiffs). The improved plaintiff payoff following simultaneous action or free-riding on precedents is likely to result from economized cost, a majority of which typically goes to legal advisers. The major appeal of class action, for instance, is the economies of scale brought about by the fact that all the class members can be represented by a single law firm. This suggests that, from the perspective of lawyers who maximize their own fees after all, decentralized plaintiff actions are desirable. As Weinstein [17] 
